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IN THE SUPR'EME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
REX L. GEORGE and MARGARET
A. UEORGE, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Awellants,

Case No.
11109

-vs.STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE

S. MANN, his wife,
Defen<.lants wnd Resipowdents.
APPELLANTS' BRJE.F
Appeal from a Judgment of the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Davis Oounty, Honorable Thornley
K. Swan, District Judge

S. MARK JOHNSON
170 West 4th South
Bountiful, Utah
Attorney for Appellants

BRADFORD AND FORBES
Layne B. Forbes
1610 South Main St.

Bountiful, Utah
Atto'l'neys for Respondents
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\
REX L. GEORGE and MARGARET
,\.

<U~ORGE,

his wife,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No.
11109

STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE
S. MANN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a sum claimed to be owing pur~uant to a contract of sale of real property located in
Davis County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'rlte case was tried to the Court. All facts and perli nPn t documents were submitted as exhibits to the Court

2
on stipulation of the parties, and the Court received
written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel. From
a judgment in favor of the defendants, no cause of action ,
plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and judgment in their favor in the amount of $3,600.84 together
with interest and costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts were stipulated by the parties hereto (R.

21-23), and are set out below for the convenience of this
Court:
1. On the 29th day of October, 1959, the Defendant8
entered into an agret'ment styled "Option and Contract to
Purchase Real Property" with the mother of the Defendant, NELLIE C. MANN, concerning real property located at vVoods Cross, Davis County, Utah. A copy of
this agreement is attached lwreto as Exhibit "A" and
made a part hereof as though set out herein verbatim.
2.

The said option and contract to purchase pro-

vided, among othPr things, that Dt>fendants were to pa.1·
to the said NELLlE C..MANN the sum of $100.00 on

3
2\ ovemhP r 10th of each year until the option was exere i~Nl or until it expired; that the option had to be exer-

cis<·d on or lwforp the] st day of N overnber, 1963, at 12 :00
\Toon.
~).
That in September of 1961, Plaintiffs and Deft'ndants began negotiations for the purchase of the propPiiy by the Plaintiffs from the Defendants which is the
suh;jed of the option (Exhibit "A"). The negotiations
11 Pn' lmndl<:>d mainly through a real estate agency in
Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, who had been employed
by tlt<' DPfondants to secure a buyer for the property.

+.

'!'hat the parties entered into and signed a docullll'nt mtitled "I<~arnest 1Joney Receipt and Offer to Pur(·lias(»'' prepared h~v the real estate agent, which is attach(·d lwreto as }{;xhihit "B" and made a part hereof a:s
though set out herein vPrbatirn.

;J. 'rhat this "Earnest Money RPceipt and Offer to
Pnrchasp" providPd that tlw total purchase price of the
prnpt•l'ty was to bP $33,000.00; and provided, further, that
Uw lJUrchasP price was to he paid as follmvs: $100.00 as
a <lqiosit at the time the "Earnest Money Receipt and
OiTPr to Purchase" was signed, $GOO.OO when the seller
<qiprnye<l the sale, and $(),000.00 on delivery of the deed
(!J I inal eontrad of sale \Yhich was to lw on or hefore the
i 't. da:<
111.!.'.

of N owmlwr 19G1, and $100.00 per year cornrnenc-

\oY<'mlier, Hhi2 until November, 196+, at no intere::;t;
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thereafter $2,000.00 per year plus 5 % interest on th('
balance which "would amount to the assignment of option
on said property." It further provided that "this offer
contingent upon buyer being able to sell home at 1100
South 8th West, Woods Cross, U t ah, to net him $6,000.00
before November 1, 1961."
1

6. That the Defendants signed, in duplicate, a docu
ment dated the 1st day of November, 1961, and titled and
styled, "Assignment of Contract"; the original of which
was signed by STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE S.
MANN, the Defendants, and is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C" and made a part hereof as though set out herein verbatim and the carbon copy signed by the same individuals
and is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and made a part
hereof a;s though set out herein verbatim. The carbon
copy was retained by the Defendants.
7. That the said documents contain the handwrittm
provision in ink: "Subject to conditions on EarnPst
Money Receipt."
8. That the original of said document was received
by the Plaintiffs from the real estate agency and the
carbon copy was retained by the Defendants; that the provision "subject to condition on Earnest 1\foney Receipt,''
was on the original when it was received by the Plaintiffs
(Exhibit "C") and also appears on the Defendants' copy
(Exhibit "D"), hut Defendant, S'T' ANLEY C. MANN,
denif~S that he wrote it on the documents.
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9. That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1961,
a do<'urnent entitled "Real Estate Contract," was signed
h:-- >l"Pllie C. Mann, the motlwr of the Defendant S'TANL~~y C. l\IANN, \\'ho was residing with the Defendants
in tlw ~tate of California at the time and the Plaintiffs,
as Luyers of the property which is the subject of the case.
rrhis document is attached hereto as (Exhibit "E") and
rnadP a 1Jart hereof as though set out herein verbatim.
10. That J~xhibit "E" provides for the sale of the
property by NELLIE C. 1Vf ANN directly to the Plaintiffs.

1J. Pursuant to the terms of the "Earnest Money
R('CPiIJt and Offer to Purchase," Plaintiffs paid the sum
of $100.00 as a deposit' the swn of $600.00 when the seller
approvPd the sale and the sum of $6,000.00 subsequent
tu or at the tim0 of the signing of Exhibit "E."
12. That in December, 1961, an "Assignment of
Option and Contract to Purehase Real Property," a copy
of which is attaclwd h0reto as Exhibit "F," and incorporatt>d lwr0in by reference, was prepared. A copy of said
rnntrad was forwarded to Defendants in California with
tlw signatures of the Plaintiffs affixed as Second Parties.
As to \Yhether or not this document was signed by the
Deft>ndants and returned, the parties do not recall.
1:l.
f

Exhibit "l1J," heretofore referred to was pre-

·al'<'(l Ji~· Attorney GEORGE K. FADEL, copies were

mailed to NELLIE C. MANN in California, who signed
the same and returned the copies.
14. That Plaintiffs had paid to NELLIE C. ~IAXX,
or heirs, the sum of $3,G00.84 in interest for the 1wriod
running from the 22nd day of Decemher, 1961, to tlw 1st
day of N ovemhe-r, 196-!, pursuant to Exhihit "E."

The original of the stipulation and its exhibits have
been lost, but copies have been substituted. All exhibits
mentioned in the Stipulation are in the record (R. 2-1-35),
and should be carefully examined by the Court in connection with a review of the facts and consideration of the
argument.
ARGTThIENT
POINT I
IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY
FROM THE DEFENDANTS AND NOT l\IERELY TO TAKE
DEFENDANTS' OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY.

In examining the contract hetween the parties tlIP
Court should bP gi.1ided hy the principle that the intPntion of tlw parties must he dt>t<'nnined and foIIow('d.
·western DerclojJ!lle11t Compa1111I'.1\'ell,-! Utah 2nd 11~;
:!88 P.2d -152 (19;"'>5).
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At tlw time negotiations began, defendants had no
intc·rest in the property, hut held only an option to purcliasP Exhibit "A" (R. 2+-26). No Utah case on this point
lta:s be(•Jl located but there are respectable authorities
from other jurisdictions which hold that one having a
mPn' option to purchase real property has not, before the
1·xen·isP of th(_• option, any interest in real estate. Vigars
r. 1!111ci11s, 1G9 N:W. 119 (Iowa). See also the California
i'ase of Hicks v. Christensen, 164 Pac. 395, which defines
an option as a mere right to purchase property, and not
as an interest in property itself. The "Earnest Money
RPceipt and Offer to Purchase," Exhibit B (R. 27), which
was tlw initial document entered into by the parties herein, indicates dearly that this was a sale of real property
and not a mere assignment or !'ale of the option, since
l~xl1iliit B states that the paynwnts were to be made" ...
on clPliwry of dt>ed or final contract of sale" (lines 14 and
13, l•~xhihit B, R. 27), also at liDP 37 of Exhibit B (R. 27)
"... final conveyance by warranty deed" is mentioned,
mid in tlw body of this same document the defendant,
:-;tanley C. l\lann, has \Vritten that ''Release of 1 acre
frontagp of 100 feet is contingent upon completion of
~alt>." (R. 27) This all shows that the parties herein did
not intend that the plaintiffs WPre to receive a mere as~iµ;i1111ent of the option. Because the contract was for a sale
111' l'Pal property rather than for the assignment of the
1ptio11, it would have hePn nC'cessary for the defendants
111 c·'.:t'l'PisP tlw option with Nellie C. l\fann, Exhibit A
I~. 2+-2fi), and tlwn makP a salt> of the property to the
1 l:ii11til'!'s: or ill tlw alternative, they could have allowed
1

1

1

8
the plaintiffs to enter into a direct contract with thl·
owner of the property, Mrs. Nellie C. Mann, for the pmchase of the property, and then fulfill their other contractual obligations separately. They did allow the plaintiff~
to enter into a contract ·with Nellie C. Mann for tlw pmchase of the property (See Exhibit 11~ R. 30-3-t), but thPy
have refused to fulfill the remainder of their obligations-notably to reimburse plaintiffs for interest
charged in connection with thP sale before N owmber 1.
1964.
The effect of Exhibit A, the option to purchase the
property from Nellie C. Mann, which was in force at tlw
time was such that the plaintiffs could not have enterPd
into 1a contract with Nellie C. l\fann to purchase without
the acquiescence and knowledg·e of the defendants. 'T'liP
defendants did have full lrnO\Yledge of the ])articulars
hen1 sin re Nellie C. Mann is the mother of the defendant,
Stanley C. Mann, and she was residing with the dPfendants in California at the time and received the contract
of sale for her signature at the same time that the defendants received their final payment on their contract with
the plailllitiffs, Stipulation No. 9 (R. 22).
The "I~arnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase",
Exhibit B (R. 27), provides that the transaction was to
be closed on or hef'on' N ovemlwr l, 1961, hut Exhibib
"C" and '' D" ( H. 2S and 29) show that the parties intended to waivP tlii:-; provision as to the date of clo:-;in:.;
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since these instruments are dated November 1, 1961, and
ineoqJorate by reference the provisions of the Earnest
.Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, Exhibit B (R. 27).
Since the provisions were incorporated by reference it is
dear that the parties intended to have the closing of the
~ale PX tended

beyond November 1, 1961. One of the pro-

visions of the contract of sale was to the effect that the
plaintiffs would not be required to pay initerest on the
amount to be paid for the purchase of the property until
after November 1, 1964.
lf there is any ambiguity present in this contra.et

it is elementary that the writing should be construed
against the party drawing same, i.e., the defendants.Beal
11.

Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2nd 323 400 P.2d 503 (1965).
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT TO PUR-

CHASE THE PROPERTY FROM NELLIE C. MANN, THE
OWNER OF SAME, WAS WITHIN THE DEFENDANTS'
KNOWLEDGE

AND ACQUIESCENCE AND AMOUNTED

ONLY TO THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION HAD IT BEEN
ASSIGNED TO THE PLAINTIFFS BY THE DEFENDANTS
AND THEREFORE SATISFIED ONLY A PART OF THE
DEFENDANTS' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO THE
PLAINTIFFS.
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It is true that the plaintiffs enterP<l into a dirert
contract of sale with Nellie C. l\Iann for the purclias(' of
the property, Exhihit E, Stipulation 10 (R. 22), hut th(·y
<lid this i n sz;ite of dPfendant's option to purchase the rPa[
property in question, and it \ms done with the knowledµ:1·
of the defendants and thPir acquiescence, since1 Nellie C.
Mann was residing with them in California at tlw
time she signed the agreement and at the same time that
the defendants recf'iwd their final payment. (R. 22).
1

The eon tract of the plaintiffs with Nellie C. 1\fann,
1£xhibit (R. 30-34) of necessity had to follow the provisions of the option, Exhibit A, (R. 2-l--2G), and tlw plaintiffs were not ahle to receive any more Favorable contra('(
directly with Mrs. Nellie l\fann than the defendants <'onld
have done in exercising tht'ir option. ThereforP the defendants are responsihlP to the plaintiffs for a·ll.\' additional benefits they contracted to deliver to the plaintiffs
over and ahov\-~ those which could he satisfit'd lJy exerC'isc
or thP assigrn1wnt of tlw option.
Under tlw option and the contract which grew ont
of the exercise of the option it was nPcessary to pay tlw
interest to Nellie C. l\lann from tlw 22nd day of DPee11ilwr,
l9f>1, to the lst da)' of NovemhPr, 19()-1-, hut tl1e eontrad
hetw0en the parti(•s prnvidPd Pxplieitly that if tlH· plain
tiffs 1rnn·hasP<1 tl1c> propPrty tlH'.\' "-onld not hP rPquin·1l
to pa.\· intn\'st until ;1l't(•r :\'on•1!!lH'i' 1, 19G-l-, Exl1iliit
B (H. :ti).

~in<''' i1 i:-: rn1fk]lt'1z·:1 tl1nt t!iP plaintiff's paid
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the sum of $3,600.84 between the 22nd day of December
19Gl and the 1st day of November, 1964, Stipulation 14
(R. 23), they are entitled to judgment for this amount
togPther with interest, since this was clearly the intention
of the parties herein.
CONCLUSION
The stipulation and exhibits of the parties on file
herPi'll show that the intention of the parties was to the
effect that the defendants were to sell real property to
the plaintiffs. One of the provisions in the contract of
~ale was to the effect that the plaintiffs would not be
required to pay any interest om the unpaid balance of the
i''ale price until after N overnber 1, 1964. This they were
required to do, not because of any contract which they
Pntered into, but rather because of a contractual obligation of the dPfendants to NPllie C. Mann.
The intention of the parties at the time they entered
in lo the contract dictates that the judgment of the District
Court in favor of the defendants should be reversed and
.indgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount
of $3,G00.84 together with interest and costs.
R<>spectfully submitted,

S. MARK .JOHNSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs arnd
Appellants

170 West 4th South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

